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I
INTRODUCTION
A. The Conventional View of Competition and Regulation
There is no general theory of public utility regulation. What often passes for
theory is a reconstruction of historical events woven into a pattern of generalization
to meet contemporary issues. Thus, while the thesis that "Regulation is the law's
substitute for competition" is the legend on the wall of the Michigan Public Service
Commission's hearing room,' there is scant evidence that those who invoke the
slogan have examined the differential impact of market competition and regulated
monopoly on price, market development, and innovation. While market competition
provides consumers no perfect guarantee of price benefits or rapid technical and
operating innovation, it creates a readier climate for such developments than does
regulated monopoly. The available historical evidence indicates that, at least in the
communications industry, regulation has served to stabilize price and earnings of the
carriers, has inhibited innovation in rate structures, and has protected the carriers
from the competitive inroads of private manufacturers and suppliers.
The possibility of introducing additional competition in the rendering of com-
munications services has recently come to the fore. Private microwave suppliers have
threatened the monopoly of the Bell System over supply of intercity toll services,
2
and the use of the computer as a switching device has offered the possibility of sub-
stitution for established common carrier services3
0 Chief, Planning and Analysis Division, Office of Telecommunication, U.S. Department of Trans-
portation. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the Department or any element
thereof.
'AT&T, PROFIT, PERFORMANCE AND PROGRESS, A STUDY OF REGULATED AND NONREGULATED INDUSTMY
FOR BELL SYSTEM USE 64 (1952).
' See Applications of Microwave Communications, Inc., Nos. 16509-19 (F.C.C., designated for hear-
ing Feb. 2, 1966). Despite the opposition of AT&T and Western Union, this application was granted,
FCC 69-870 (Aug. 13, 1969).
'Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer and Communication
Services and Facilities, No. 16979 (Notice of Inquiry), 7 F.C.C.2d ii, i8-ig (x966):
"From the common carriers' standpoint, regulation should extend to all entities offering like
services or to none. It is urged that the ability to compete successfully depends on the flexibility
required to meet the competition, and that the carriers would be deprived of this flexibility if
they alone were restricted in their pricing practices and marketing efforts by the rigidities of a
tariff schedule. Thus, we are confronted with determining under what circumstances data processing,
computer information, and message switching services, or any particular combination thereof-
whether engaged in by established common carriers or other entities-are or should be subject
to the provisions of the Communications Act."
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These are just two of several developments in technology which could alter the
structure of the communications industry.
Potential changes in market or regulatory structure almost invariably breed new
explanations for existing conditions, or, as here, recrudescence of old ideology. Thus,
in a dissent to the Report of the Presidential Task Force on Communications Policy,
the Director of the Office of Telecommunications Management stated,
Experience going back some seventy years has demonstrated that competition
in the provision of local telephone service was inherently inefficient and led to
poorer quality service at higher cost.4
The history of the period of communications competition in the United States,
roughly the years 1893 to 1920, is apparently not too well known, and the view that
the existence of competition in communications led to inefficiency, poorer quality,
and higher cost in telephony is arrived at by a series of logical inferences which
ignore the evidence that is favorable to competition. It will be the purpose of this
paper to review this segment of domestic economic history and at least to question
the contention raised in the preceding quotation.
B. Survey of the Competitive Era
The independent telephone industry began in 1893 with the expiration of the
Bell System patents on the telephone handset. From its inception until about 1913
there was limited interconnection between the independent and the Bell exchanges.
Refusal to interconnect was, of course, a tool employed in the competitive battle for
domination of the industry. Interconnection refusal was not limited to the strictly
duplicating situations, but was also extended to service areas where Bell had never
chosen to provide telephone service. When competition took the form of over-
lapping exchanges of rival companies,5 the impact on plant requirements was
apparent. A subscriber desiring telephone service with access to all users was
required to obtain two separate telephone instruments; a separate subscriber loop
had to be furnished from each telephone instrument to a central office, necessitating
separate central office lines both served by switchboard operators.6 There clearly
must have been some duplication of facilities and investment under this arrangement.
See also Invin, The Computer Utility: Competition or Regulation?, 76 YALE L.J. 1299 (1967); Irwin
Computers and Communications: The Economics of Interdependence, in this symposium, p. 360; Dunn,
Policy Issues Presented by the Interdependence of Computer and Communications Service, in this sym-
posium, p. 369.
'PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON COMMUNICATIONS POLICY, FINAL REPORT app. A, at 1 (1968) (dissent
of General James O'Connell) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE REPORT].
'In 1907, overlapping territory was estimated at 20%, but this was only about one-third of all
exchanges. G. JOHNSTON, SOME COMMENTS ON THE 1907 ANNUAL REPORT OF AT&T (Int'l Independent
Tel. Ass'n, Sept. 19o8).
'The duplication of subscriber directory services must have been a source of annoyance to business
customers.
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However, the degree of "inefficiency" and "higher cost" has never been demon-
strated, and perhaps it is not determinable.
Early Bell System telephone development took place at the business core of
large urban communities.7 Since territorial extension by the competing independents
was for the most part to contiguous rather than overlapping geographic areas,'
the provision of distribution plant must have been more often complementary than
duplicative. For the small central offices in use at the time there were no sig-
nificant differences in cost per line for separate as against combined switching
facilities, and, in the absence of interconnection, this could not have materially affected
total investment.9 Dual services, in the absence of interconnection of the rival com-
panies at the central offices, necessarily required dual telephone instruments, but the
instrument and its associated wiring probably made up less than ten per cent of
the average investment per station. ' Any rigorous examination of the effect of
competition on communication costs would require knowledge of the capacity and
rate of utilization of facilities prior to and subsequent to the inroads made by the
independents.
A characteristic of telephone service is that it must be planned for and con-
structed in anticipation of future demand. A common lament of the Bell System
at the time (reflected in reports to shareholders) was that its own facilities were
continually inadequate to meet market demand or were not physically located where
demand had developed." It can be. conjectured that where independents did make
inroads into Bell territory and literal duplication of service areas occurred, it was
largely due to either the unavailability of Bell plant or the promotional efforts and
attractive pricing offered by independent operating companies.
In evaluating the charge that telephone competition engendered inefficiency,
poorer quality, and higher costs, several considerations must be borne in mind.
All competition involves some redundancy of plant facilities and work effort.
The question is whether the pressure of competing market forces produces a better
or cheaper product than a single supply service. The evidence is clear that under
a regime of monopoly supply, during the period 1879-93, the system was stagnant.
The competitive period following expiration of the Bell patents in 1893-94 resulted
in the most rapid rate of growth of service in the history of the industry as well
as in a substantial reduction in rates for business and residential telephone service.
This comparison alone does not satisfactorily or completely answer the question
whether competition was inefficient and costly. Yet with respect to the duplication
19xo AT&T ANN. REP. 23-24.
'JOHNSTON, supra note 5.
'In 19o2 the average switchboard served 225 lines. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, SPECIAL REPORTS-
TELEPHONES AND TELEGRAPHS, table 37, at 33 (1902).
"°Investment per station at the turn of the century was about $200. 19xi AT&T ANN. RrP. 17.
This source shows the average plant cost per exchange station from 1895 to 1911. The concurrent in-
vestment in station equipment is estimated at about $20 per station.
2 o1900-07 AT&T ANN. REPs.
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argument for inefficiency we see evidence of plant redundancy within the Bell
System itself-duplication and triplication of exchange cable facilities, establishment
of second and third wire centers within a few years of opening an initial office.
Of course, this evidence may merely attest to the lack of omniscience of a highly
centralized, carefully planned telephone organization. But just as Bell spokesmen
would argue that a second cable on the pole line does not represent inefficiency or
high cost, the independents could insist, during the competitive era, that in a period
of extremely rapid growth (created by their existence) all facilities were efficient,
necessary, and provided at reasonable cost.
The infusion of competition did force a substantial disruption of the operations
of the Bell System. Profitability, rate levels and structure, and the whole innovative
process were markedly affected by the coming of competition. The Bell System did
not take this assault lightly. It changed tactics and practices and ultimately appealed
for state intervention-the regulatory process-to stabilize and normalize competitive
forces. This history is recounted below tor such light as it may shed on the relative
strengths or weaknesses of competition and regulated monopoly.
II
HISTORICAL AccOUNT
1 2
A. The Period of Monopoly, 1879-93
The expiration of the basic Bell patents in 1893-94 marked the end of the System's
complete monopoly over the telephone field. Since 1879 the Bell System had deter-
mined the industry's rate of expansion and the location and direction of service
development as well as the charges for such service, deriving handsome profits from
its efforts. At the end of 1894, equity ownership of Bell stockholders consisted of
$2o million of common stock and $18 million of accumulated surplus. Of the com-
mon stock, $5 million represented the original offering (for which $5oo,ooo in cash
had been paid), while the remaining $15 million came from subsequent issues.
The return on this investment was almost forty-six per cent during the period, with
declared dividends averaging fifteen per cent or a total of $25 million.
Monopoly pricing had its counterpart in restricted growth. Although Bell initially
contemplated the telephone for use in private line service, it soon saw the advantage
of exchange service. However, high rate levels and inadequate facilities combined
to prohibit rapid expansion or development. Service was provided by use of iron
wire or on grounded circuits with a local battery power source' 3 and was directed
to customers located within a mile of the wire center. Since central offices were
" This section is based upon the narrative in FCC, PROPOSED REPORT, TELEPHONE INVESTIGATION pt.
2, at 134-66 (1938) [hereinafter cited as VALKER REPORT].
" H. CASSON, THE HISTORY OF THE TELEPHONE r68-69 (I910); BuREAu OF TE CENSUS, SPEcIAL
REPORTs-TELPHONES 14 (1907).
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usually located in the center of a large urban community's business-industrial area,
residential, suburban, and rural service went largely undeveloped.
Public relations were usually ignored during the patent monopoly period while
the System concentrated on reaping large profits. As later assessed by the FCC, "the
System's attitude toward the public was characterized by arrogance and indiffer-
ence."
14
B. The Competitive Period: Development of Service
Although its patent monopoly enabled Bell to obtain franchises and establish
service in the most lucrative, populous sections of the country, numerous independent
telephone companies and manufacturers were formed following the expiration of
these patents. While these concerns concentrated their efforts on regions not yet
reached by the Bell System, they also offered competing services in many areas
already served by Bell. Thus a major effect of the advent of telephone competition
was the stimulation and growth of telephone service. An abbreviated summary of
this development over the period 1876-1920 is shown in Table I.
TABLE I
TOTAL TELEPHONES IN U.S. AT DECEMBER 31 AT FoUR-YEAR INTERVALS,
1876-1920
Total Total
Year Telephones Year Telephones
1876 .......................... 2,593 1900 ..................... 1,355,911
1830 .......................... 47,880 1904 ................. ... 3,353,247
1884 .......................... 147,715 1903 ..................... 6,483,620
1883 .......................... 194,966 1912 ..................... 8,954,936
1892 .......................... 260,795 1916 ..................... 11,241,432
1896 .......................... 40 ,301 1920 ..................... 13,411,379
Source: WA L p ET, table 3S, at 143-44.
Perhaps a clearer image of the effect of competition on telephone development is
given by a comparison of the rate of station growth during the period of patent
monopoly and in the years immediately subsequent thereto. Table 2 illustrates this
effect. Seventeen years after telephone communications had originated there were
266,431 stations operating-all owned by Bell. By the end of 1902, only ten years
later, Bell maintained 1,317,178 stations and the independent companies owned an
additional 1,053,866. The independents were able to maintain approximately this
relative position until 19o7, when they owned 3.0 million stations compared to 3.1
million owned by Bell.' 5
WALxR REPORT, supra note 12, at 561. A more comprehensive discussion of the Bell System's
pre-i9io public relations policies can be found in N. Long, Public Relations Policies of the Bell System,
A Case Study in the Politics of Modern Industry (Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard Univ., 1937).
"= BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CENSUS OF ELECTRICAL INDUSTRIES-TELEPHONES (932).
____________________ 'a.-.- ~.LhJ..t....
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TABLE 2
ANNUAL PER CENT INCREASE IN TOTAL NUMBER OF TELEPHONE STATIONS,
1885-1905
Annual Per Cent
Increase in Number
Year of Stations
Period of Patent Monopoly
1885-94 ........................................................... . 6.3 (avg.)
Period of Competition
1895 .............................................................. 19.0
1897 .............................................................. 27.4
1899 .............................................................. 47.6
1901 ............................................................. 32.8
1903 ............................................................. 18.4
1905 .............................................................. 23.1
Source: W.ALrrn &roar, tibb 32, at 143; table33, at 151.
The rise of the independent companies resulted in a substantial amount of service
competition during this period. Out of x,o5i U.S. cities with a 1902 population
greater than 4,000, i,oo2 had telephone facilities. The independents provided ex-
clusive service in 137 of these and Bell in 414; the remaining 451 communities-
almost half-received service from two or more companies.16
The growth which characterized this early competitive era was both intensive
and extensive. It was intensive in that it was marked by a higher saturation of
development, particularly of residential services, than had been attempted during the
period of patent monopoly. It was extensive in that service was extended for the
first time to suburban and rural areas. This vigorous pursuit of new markets,
engaged in by Bell as well as by the independents, was greatly facilitated by sub-
stantial rate reductions bringing the telephone within the financial grasp of a larger
consumer group.
In 1907 the Baker-Morgan banking interests gained control of the Bell System
and replaced President Frederick Fish with Theodore Vail.' Vail substantially
reversed a number of Bell policies, emphasizing absorption of the competition in
preference to the earlier policy of expansion of Bell-constructed facilities. This change
in emphasis resulted in a rapid diminution in the independents' proportion of total
industry telephones. The decline continued until the independents' share reached
its present ratio of about fifteen per cent.'8
C. The Competitive Period: Rates
As competition increased, the rates Bell had charged during the patent monopoly
period decreased significantly. Average revenue per Bell station dropped from $88
2'BUREAU OP THE CENsus, SPECIAL REPORTS-TELEPHONES AND TELEGRAPHS (1902).
11 WALKER REPORT, supra note 12, at 1o-o
" As of December 3s, I968, the Bell System had 87 million telephones, while independent companies
served 17 million.
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TABLE 3
COMPARISON OF ANNUAL EXCHANGE RATES FOR BELL EXCHANGES WITH AND
WITHOUT COMPETITION, 1894-i9o9
1894 1909
Bell Bell Independents
Exchanges Without Competition
Business Service ............................. 68.10 36.00 N.App.
Residential Service ........................... 96.00 23.75 N.App.
Exchanges With Competition
Business Service ............................. 78.65 41.25 37.15
Residential Service ........................... 65.00 22.80 23.25
Sourca: 1909 AT&T ANN. REP. 25 (chart), 28.
in 1895, the first year of competition, to $43 in 19o7. This effect on Bell System
rates was not limited to those exchanges facing direct competition; the same benefit
was also extended to patrons in areas where Bell retained exclusive service. As
shown in Table 3, these rate reductions were about the same in exchange areas
without competition as in those served by other exchanges in addition to Bell.
President Vail used this evidence to argue that it was not the competitive forces
which were leading to price reduction but cost savings initiated by the company.'0
As there is no evidence of comparable performance during the period of patent
monopoly,"0 this turns the question slightly. Absent market competition, what in-
centive did the System have to generate cost economies?
D. The Competitive Period: Development of the Art
During the period of the Bell monopoly, the technical activities of the company
were not primarily concerned with, nor organized for, development of the art through
its own forces. Rather, effort was directed toward purchasing patents for the
purpose of extending company control in the field of telephony. Prior to 1907
little or no attention was given by the Bell System to what came to be known as
"fundamental research."'
The major developments in the art, up to this point, originated outside the Bell
System. The Strowger switch, which made possible the advent of automatic telephony,
was invented by an undertaker and manufactured by several of the independent
manufacturers,22 while the use of dial telephone service was actually resisted by
Bell leadership. 3 The loading coil was developed by Professor Pupin of Columbia
19 59io AT&T ANN. REP. 25-29.
20 WALKER REPORT, supra note 12, at 203, 243-50.
2 id. at 207.
2 Id. at 300.
"
5 Theodore N. Vail in 1913 AT&T ANN. REP. 20:
"It has frequently been asserted that the Bell System did not employ automatic switchboards
because of patents controlled by others .... [It] is not automatic for the subscriber as the sub-
scriber does all the manipulation in the making of a connection."
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University around 19o5. This coil tremendously improved the quality of telephone
transmission, actually making possible, for the first time, a long distance telephone
system.2 4 Perhaps the most significant technical development of the period-and
another major innovation from outside the Bell System 25-was Lee De Forest's
development of the vacuum tube in 1914. There were numerous other developments of
the art during this period, but they can be considered more as refinements of toll and
exchange service than as major technical breakthroughs.
When Vail reassumed the presidency of AT&T in 19o7, he shifted company
emphasis from patent purchase and development to the creation of a technical
and research staff capable of "occupying the field":
One of the first things that was fully developed in our minds was the necessity
of occupying the field; .... Just as soon as we started into the district exchange
system we found out that it would develop a thousand and one little patents and
inventions with which to do the business which was necessary, and that is what we
wanted to control and get possession of. So from the very commencement we had
our experimental department, so-called . . . whose business it was to study the
patents, study the development and study these devices that either were originated
by our own people or came in to us from the outside.
26
The objective of dominating the field and asserting technical leadership in the
telephonic and allied arts has served the company well down to the present day.
In 1927 J. E. Otterson of the company restated and amplified the Bell System
objective in the following words:
A primary purpose of the American Telephone & Telegraph Co. is the defense
and maintenance of its position in the telephone field in the United States.
Undertakings and policies must be made to conform to the accomplishment of
this purpose.
The American Telephone & Telegraph Co. is surrounded by potentially com-
petitive interests which may in some manner or degree intrude upon the telephone
field.
The problem is to prevent this intrusion.
[.. T]he best defense is to continue [research] activities in "no man's land"
and to maintain such strong engineering, patent, and commercial situation in con-
nection with these competitive activities as to always have something to trade
against the accomplishment of other parties.
27
Although it is surrounded by other industrial fields such as satellite communications
and the computer application to switching and information storage, the Bell System
"Doherty, The Bell System and the People Who Built It, 46 BELL LA. REcoRD 76-83 (i968).
"Id. at 38-46; WALKER REPORT, supra note 12, at 415.
"Testimony of Theodore N. Vail, Record, vol. 2, at 1542-43, Western Union Tel. Co. v. American
Bell Tel. Co., 187 Fed. 425 (1911), reprinted in WALKER REPORT, supra note 12, at 203 n.7.
'" Memorandum by J.E. Otterson, Jan. 13, 1927, reprinted in WALKER REPORT, supra note 12, at 235-
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now enjoys a controlling position in the field of wire telephony. The strong financial
and technical resources of the Bell System, and particularly the research policy initi-
ated by Theodore Vail, underlie its defense against any threatened invasion.
E. Airing the Dispute Over Competition
Despite the greater availability and reduced rates for telephone service, there
was public criticism, particularly from the business community, of the duplicate
service situations. Much of this criticism was stimulated by the Bell System, but the
independents were not loath to build their own "back-fires." Theodore Vail's first
annual report to stockholders, which was reproduced and widely distributed to press
and public organs, treated the theme of telephone competition at length:
Duplication of plant is a waste to the investor. Duplication of charges is a waste
to the user....
... [T]he public must pay double charges, on double capital, double operating
expenses and double maintenance. 28
In two widely disseminated reports, the independents prepared a response to
President Vail. They are quoted at some length to obtain the flavor of the con-
troversy:
Previous to 1895, when independent telephony began, it was next to impossible
for a small town to get even a toll station established .... The style and efficiency
of the transmitter was the same practically throughout the monopoly and the circuit
conditions had undergone little or no change, the lines being mostly grounded
circuits of iron wire .... Operators' service was given very little attention ....
[T]hey failed to properly appreciate conditions peculiar to varying localities ....
... [P]robably the strongest ground for complaint was exorbitant rates ....
The very first effect of competition was a bettering of the service rendered by the
Bell Company by more careful attention to operators' work, the substitution of
either common return or metallic circuits for grounded lines, and, the introduction
of different grades of service (party lines) by which means they offered cheaper
rates with the minimum of reduction in revenue per line to themselves .... After
these came quickly, the extension of toll lines to small places, and a marked differ-
ence in their interest in local conditions 29
[Columbus, Ohio, is cited as an illustration of the beneficial effects of competi-
tion.] The Citizens Telephone Company [independent] began agitation for a
franchise late in 1898, when the Central Union (Bell) Telephone Company had less
than I9OO telephones, with rates near the business district as high as $96 a year for
business telephones and $48 for residence telephones, and with additional charges
for distance beyond one mile or more from the exchange. The rates throughout the
city today [i9o8] are respectively $54 and $27 a year for Bell main line business
and residence telephones .... At the present time each company has in the neigh-
borhood of i2,ooo [telephones] ....
28 1907 AT&T ANN. REP. IA.
"J. AiNswoRTi & G. JoHNSroN, A DiscussioN OF TELEPHONE COMPETITION 7-8 (Int'l Independent
Tel. Ass'n, Feb. 19o8).
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[The author goes on to discuss the accessibility of 24,000 stations for about the
same total charges as for 19oo stations ten years previously.]
* * * [Duplicate investments] are mostly in the business districts nearest the
exchange, where the cable units, by reason of short lengths and the most economical
sizes, are cheapest ....
Switchboards, if not connected, are cheaper separated than combined ...
Two pole lines may represent waste when they are parallel with no more of a
load than could be borne on one. They may have no element of waste with a greater
load, or when shared with other wire-using companies ...
Of the subway and conduit system only that smaller portion is waste which
is represented by the costs of opening and repaving the streets ....
The cost of interior wiring and instruments is duplicated only in proportion
to the duplication of telephones 30
The public airing of this controversy over the relative benefits and disadvantages
of telephone competition may have had some effect on the informed public. But
as in many industrial battles over markets, the most effective weapons were financial
and economic. To understand this result, we must examine the Bell System response
to competition.
III
BELL REACTION TO COMPETITION
3 1
The loss of its patent monopoly in 1893 and the incursion of competition was
followed by the Bell System with efforts to destroy or mitigate the effects of the
competition. Tactics employed for this purpose during the tenure of President
Fish differed markedly from those initiated by President Vail in 1907. In the early
period competition was met through rapid expansion of Bell service. In the later
period, i9o7-2o, when the Baker-Morgan financial interests had obtained control of
the company, competition was allayed by purchase and absorption of independent
properties. In addition to a change in method of expansion, Bell employed other
devices which are discussed below in the comparison of the two eras. The change in
the Bell System's rate of expansion of telephone service is shown in Table 4.
A. Early Competitive Era, 1894-i9o6
During the period 1894-i9o6 the Bell System employed a variety of methods in
addition to its expansion policy in meeting the independents. Among these were
(I) an active propaganda campaign; (2) refusal to connect with certain independent
companies; and (3) refusual to sell telephone instruments to non-Bell companies.
I. Bell Reprisal: Propaganda Campaign
Bell's propaganda against the independents took many forms. Its objective was
to undermine the competition's interests with the public, with bankers, with legis-
3' JOHNSTON, supra note 5, at 6-8, i5-I6.
" This section is based upon the narrative in WALKER REPORT, supra note 12, at 134-66.
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TABLE 4
ANNUAL RATE Or GROWTH IN BELL TELEPHONE STATIONS AND PLANT INVESTMENT,
1885-1912
Average Per Cent
Increase in Number Average Per Cent
of Telephone Increase in Plant
Period Stations Investment
1885-94 .......................................... 6.3 8.2
1895-1906 ........................................ 21.5 15.0
1907-12 .......................................... 9.6 8.5
SOurce: WALKER REPorT, tables 33 & 34, at 151, 152.
latures, and with present or prospective investors. This campaign appears to have
had considerable success against the larger independent telephone companies. How-
ever, the smaller mutuals and independents, which grew directly out of local com-
munity needs and were less dependent on central capital markets, were apparently
less affected by the propaganda efforts.
2. Bell Reprisal: Refusal of Interconnection
Refusal to connect with independent telephone systems for long distance tele-
phone service afforded Bell a stronger means of curbing the independent movement.
Since Bell was the pioneer in this field, its refusal to connect confined independent
companies within the limits of the particular territories they served. The in-
dependents early recognized this weakness of their position, and they attempted, in
1899, to form an independent long-distance network. The extensive financing
required for such an undertaking was to be organized through a consortium including
the Peter Widener interest. At the request of Mr. Morgan of the banking firm,
Widener withdrew as financial sponsor of the undertaking, and it collapsed shortly
thereafter."2 It it significant that the Baker-Morgan group shortly thereafter acquired
the Bell properties and made them the nucleus of an even stronger communications
system including both the Bell System and Western Union Telegraph Co.3
3. Bell Reprisal: Refusal to Sell
Another weapon employed by Bell against the independents was its refusal to sell
telephone equipment outside the System. This encouraged the development and
growth of independent telephone manufacturing concerns once the Bell patents bad
expired, and the three most important independent manufacturers-Kellogg Switch-
board & Supply Co., Stromberg-Carlson Telephone Manufacturing Co., and Auto-
matic Electric Co. 4--were established during this period. The existence of the in-
2 69 Coat. & FN. CHRONICLE 1151 (1899).
33 VALKER REPORT, stupra note 12, at 99 n.4.
"' It is interesting to note that today these three companies are subsidiaries of ITT, General Dynamics,
and General Telephone, respectively.
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dependent telephone manufacturing firms encouraged competitive product develop-
ment. Development of automatic dial service, the supplanting of local magneto by
common battery service, development of full manual multiple-operator service, and
a number of refinements in relay manufacture can be traced to the efforts of in-
dependents during this period.3 5 Independent innovations in harmonic ringing and
signalling systems eventually led to problems of system compatibility when Bell later
partially reversed its position and sought interconnection with the independents.
The refusal of the Bell System to sell telephone apparatus to independents failed
to stop their competition, so Bell then attempted to acquire control of Kellogg and
Stromberg-Carlson. Both attempts ultimately failed through intervention of public
authorities, who had them set aside on the ground that they would create a
monopoly in the manufacture of telephone equipment.
B. Late Competitive Era, 19o7-2o
The onset of Baker-Morgan control over the System in 1907 precipitated an
abrupt change in Bell's policy toward independents. This reversal was evidenced
by a reduction in the rate of Bell System internal expansion coupled with a policy
of buying up independent properties. As Table 4 indicates, the average rate of growth
of Bell stations in the early period of competition, 1895-19o6, was 21.5 per cent;
while for the years 19o7-12 the annual rate of expansion dropped to 9.6 per cent.
Rapid market expansion had cost heavily in investment dollars, and rate levels
were declining so fast that revenue increases lagged investment growth. In successive
reports to stockholders, President Fish lamented the decreasing profitability resulting
from competition:
[I]n certain localities, rates too low to cover current expenses and necessary
allowance for renewal have been offered, to meet similar rates offered by competi-
tors.3 6
And again in 19o4:
In some places in the country, particularly where there has been the demoralizing
effect of unintelligent competition, the rates are at the present time too low.37
In his last annual report, President Fish repeated the theme:
[Tihe unintelligent views of our competitors as to what rates for service are
possible have created conditions in the portions of the country to which reference
is now made, under which neither they nor the Bell companies are getting proper
returns for the service rendered.38
President Fish's critical remarks about the "unintelligent competition" were stimu-
lated by real events. During the period of patent monopoly, the company had
"T. GARY, THE STORY OF THE INDEPENDENT TELEPHONE INDUSTRY (circa 1935).
So ioo AT&T ANN. PEP. 10.
ST 1904 AT&T ANN. REP. IO.
as i9o6 AT&T ANN. REP. 12.
352 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
enjoyed an average return on investment of nearly forty-six per cent. For the com-
petitive years 19oo-o6, net earnings on average net investment dropped to the
vicinity of eight per cent 3 9
To meet the competition, as noted above, President Fish had initiated a program
of rapid plant expansion. Between 1895 and 1905, Bell System assets nearly quad-
rupled, rising from $120 million to $453 million° The need for what, at that time,
were tremendous additional capital resources, led to control of the System by the
Baker-Morgan financial interests and the replacement of Fish by Vail.4 President
Vail, in addition to slowing the rate of company expansion, introduced other major
policy changes which effectively challenged the competition's advance. These policies
were quite different from those of the early competitive era and are discussed under
(1) policy of acquisition; (2) interconnection; (3) sales to independents; and (4)
regulation.
i. Late Competitive Era: Acquisition Policy
With the curtailment of its own rate of internal expansion, the Bell System,
beginning in 19o7, launched an aggressive program of acquiring independent
telephone properties. The effect of this change in policy is demonstrated by the
shift in the ratio of telephones between the two segments of the industry. In 1907
the independents owned 3.0 million stations, while Bell owned 3.J million. By 1912,
there were 3.6 million independent stations and 5.1 million Bell stations.1 The pro-
portion of independently owned stations decreased progressively until about 1940.
Bell's acquisition attempts were strongly resisted by the independents, who made
complaint to the Attorney General, George Wickersham. They were joined in
charging antitrust violations by the Postal Telegraph-Mackay interests, because the
Bell System had earlier succeeded in acquiring control of Western Union Telegraph
Company, and the physical consolidation of Bell System and Western Union
properties threatened to undercut Postal Telegraph markets.43
As a result of these complaints, AT&T vice-president N. C. Kingsbury met with
the Attorney General and later in 1913 drafted an agreement which became known
as the Kingsbury Commitment.44 Under this agreement, the Bell System agreed
not to acquire control over any competing company, and it agreed to connect its
system with those owned by independents if the latter met Bell System equipment
requirements. The Commitment did not restrict the Bell System from acquiring
39 Staff Reports, Exhibit s3 6o-B, table 84, at 425, prepared for introduction into evidence for the
,VALxK REPORT, supra note 12.
"Id., Exhibit 136o-A, table 7, at 52.
"1 See text accompanying note 17 supra.
42 1932 CENSUS, supra note 15.
Staff Reports, supra note 39, Exhibit 2o96-D, ch. 3. It is interesting to note that the Bell
System's first attempt to unite the telephone and telegraph industries involved the Mackay-Postal Tele-
graph interests in preference to Western Union. WALKR REPORT, supra note 12, at 97"99.
"'The Kingsbury Commitment is reproduced in 1913 AT&T ANN. REP. 24-26.
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noncompeting telephone companies. Between 1913 and 1917 the Bell System pur-
chased over 241,000 stations from the independents and sold 58,000 stations. During
the war years, ig8-ig, the Post Office Department assumed control over all tele-
phone properties, and these were the only years after 1912 when the Bell System
sold more stations than it acquired.
The competitive milieu created by the Kingsbury Commitment was not viable
for many independents, as they were unable to dispose of their properties on favor-
able terms. Therefore, the independents joined Bell in seeking passage of the Willis-
Graham Act of 1921, which permitted the merger or consolidation of competing
telephone companies." Passage of the Willis-Graham Act was construed by the
Attorney General as terminating the Kingsbury Commitment, and Bell again under-
took an aggressive policy of acquiring independent properties. The intensity of Bell's
activity in this regard once again created apprehension among the independents.
After some negotiations, the Bell System sent a letter, which became known as the
Hall Memorandum, to F. B. MacKinnon, president of the United States Independent
Telephone Association. Dated June 14, 1922, this correspondence stated Bell's new
policy relative to acquisitions. The Bell System agreed "to make no purchases of, or
consolidations with, independents unless demanded for the convenience of the
public or unless special reasons existed making the transaction desirable for the
protection of the general public service or Bell System property."46 Using these
two exceptions the Bell System then continued to make such acquisitions of in-
dependent properties as it desired.
2. Late Competitive Era: Interconnection
Until the Kingsbury Commitment was entered into in 1913, the Bell System, in
varying degrees, refused to interconnect with independent exchanges for long-
distance service. President Vail explained the Bell System hostility to interconnection:
"Offering a connection with a so-called competing exchange . . . is offering a
different service, except so far as they connect the same subscribers, and there it is
of no benefit, as either one would serve the purpose.
'
"47
The independent telephone companies resisted interconnection as well and were
active in opposing state legislation which would compel physical ties between
competing telephone companies. This viewpoint was expressed by F. B. Mac-
"Act of June xo, x92i, ch. 20, 42 Stat. 27. The legislative history of the Willis-Graham Act is in
the ICC official library. 63 CONG. Rac. 1983 (1921) (remarks of Representative Winslow):
"The bill was brought to the attention of the committee by those representing a very large
majority of the so-called independent telephone companies of the United States.
" . . Many of them . . . are skating on very thin ice in respect of their financial opera-
tions .... [T]hey have represented to the committee . . . that if the opportunity to sell or
consolidate is not afforded to them they are liable to go through the condition of bankruptcy ...
" WALKER REPoRT, supra note 12, at 158.
47 x9o9 AT&T ANN. REP. 24.
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Kinnon, president of the United States Independent Telephone Association, before
a joint congressional committee as follows:
Representative HUDDLESTON. How does it [compulsory interconnection] ruin an
exchange?
Mr. MACKINNON. If an exchange which is now operating successfully is obliged
to give up its entire toll system and its connections to another exchange in the
same town and which has no money invested in that toll system, it may be that
that other exchange ...can take away the subscribers of the other exchange. 48
The successful competitor strives to become the surviving monopolist.
It is futile to reflect on what could have been. In view of the opposition by both
segments of the telephone industry to interconnection of competing facilities and
the general laissez-faire attitude of public authorities, the likelihood of achieving
interconnection was remote. Despite the independents' inadequate financial resources
(partly due to Bell pressure), had there been full interconnection during the early
years of competitive rivalry, it may be hazarded that the structure of the telephone
industry would have been more equally balanced. There is little question but that
interconnection would have relieved subscribers of the burden of dual instruments
and separate directories and lessened the public demand for forced consolidations.
The Bell System watchword "Universal Service" could have been achieved without
"One System, One Policy."
It may be that the extensive financial resources of the Bell System, with its
banker support, would, in any event, have overwhelmed the struggling independent
industry. The independents were fragmented and frequently fought as bitterly
among themselves as they did against the Bell System. By the time Vail assented
to interconnection with noncompeting independents, the relative decline of this
segment of the industry was evident. It was a decline brought on by Bell's aggressive
acquisition policy and the financial difficulties being experienced by the independents.
In part, the inability of independents to secure additional capital is explained by the
reluctance of bankers to finance closed systems-exchange areas without access to the
outside world through toll interties. During the critical years in which the legis-
lators might have acted, i893-i9o7, the public and the companies were disinterested.
Policy, in an issue of this sort, is made through the clash of competing interests.
Because both segments of the industry opposed interconnection at the time, a salient
opportunity was lost.
3. Late Competitive Era: Bell Sales Policy
As noted earlier, the refusal of the Bell System to sell telephonic equipment to
non-Bell companies proved a failure as a weapon in fighting the independents.
With the advent of banker control of the Bell System in 19o7, this policy was
4" Joint Hearings on S. 1313 Before the Committees on Interstate Commerce, 67th Cong., ist Scss. 8
(1921).
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reversed, and sales to independents and on the open market were permitted. There
were several reasons for changing the company sales policy toward independents.
At the time (i9o7), the Bell System patent situation was such that the company
had almost no exclusive patent protection which would prevent independents from
developing satisfactory central office, outside plant, or station equipment. The vigor-
ous development of independent telephone manufacturers, concurrent with the
growth of independent telephone operating companies, attested to this fact. By
1907 there were about as many independently owned telephone stations as Bell-
owned stations. The independents constituted a sizeable prospective market for
Western Electric, Bell's wholly-owned manufacturing subsidiary, and Western sought
a share in this independent market in competition with the independent manufac-
turing firms.
In addition, there were future advantages in undertaking the sale of Bell-
Western equipment to the independent operating companies. Vail had initiated a
deliberate policy of acquiring independent operating properties and absorbing these
into the Bell System. The installation of Bell System equipment into independent
plant made for compatibility and uniformity of equipment and rendered later
acquisition of such companies more attractive.4 9
4. Late Competitive Era: Regulation
Possibly the most significant policy reversal initiated under Vail's tenure as
AT&T president was with respect to public regulation. Throughout the period of
patent monopoly (1873-93) and the early years of competition (1894-i9o6) the Bell
System opposed government intervention and regulation of the telephone business.
This view was wholly consonant with the prevailing industrialist viewpoint.
Bankers, however, require more stability and rationality of operations than can be
evinced by a cutthroat competitive environment. President Fish was ousted and Vail
reinstated as president of the Bell System by the Baker-Morgan banking groups.
These large eastern banks had been key witnesses to the creation and operation of the
Interstate Commerce Commission and had observed federal regulatory efforts to
reduce the rail carrier intransigency which produced "price wars." The ICC was
"making good" in its efforts to stabilize markets and price structures in the railroad
business without invading private managerial prerogatives. Vail early saw the
possibilities of effecting such normalization and stability in the telephone industry.
The opening signal of this reversal of viewpoint was the discussion of "Public
Control" in the 1907 Annual Report to stockholders:
It is contended that if there is to be no competition, there should be public
control.
It is not believed that there is any serious objection to such control, provided
it is independent, intelligent, considerate, thorough and just, recognizing, as does
"This thesis is developed further in Staff Reports, supra note 39, Exhibit 2o 9 6-D.
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the Interstate Commerce Commission in its report recently issued, that capital
is entitled to its fair return, and good management or enterprise to its rewardY0
Two years later Mr. Vail was somewhat more equivocal:
Although there have been abuses in corporate management . yet it must
be admitted that the tremendous development of utilities in this country as
compared with other countries . . . is to a certain extent due to the lack of
proscriptive restrictions.
We believe that if there is to be control, there should be protection . . . . We
believe that management or operation by a body without any accountable responsi-
bility [i.e., regulatory commissions] would be prejudicial to the best interests of the
service and of the public, and destructive . ... r
By i9io President Bell could see the broad picture:
It is not believed that this [integration of service] can be accomplished by
separately controlled or distinct systems nor that there can be competition in the
accepted sense of competition.
It is believed that all this can be accomplished to the reasonable satisfaction of
the public with its acquiescence, under such control and regulation as will afford
the public much better service at less cost than any competition or government-
owned monopoly could permanently afford ....
[T]his "supervision" should stop at "control" and "regulation" and not
"manage," "operate" nor dictate what the management or operation should be ....
If there is to be state control and regulation, there should also be state pro-
tection-protection to a corporation striving to serve the whole community . . .
from aggressive competition which covers only that part which is profitable.
A public utility giving good service at fair rates should not be subject to
competition at unfair rates.
52
Regulation is a two-sided coin: on one side lies the aspect of public protection-
profit limitations, the obligation to provide service at nondiscriminatory rates, and so
forth. The other side of the coin bears the aspect of utility protection-including bars
to ccmpetidve entry, exclusive franchise, and the right of eminent domain. With an
insight that was to serve Bell corporate interests well, Vail anticipated the limited
inroads that public regulation would make in obtaining the first series of objectives
and the extensive benefits conferred by the second. Real power would always rest
with those responsible for management of telephone operations, and Vail was always
insistent on the distinction between "regulation" and "management." Although
the program of acquiring independent properties was being pursued unabated, the
o 907 AT&T ANN. REP. 18.
52 i9o9 AT&T ANN. REP. 34, 36.
52 i91o AT&T ANN. Rvp. 23, 32, 33.
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combined objective of "Universal Service-One System, One Policy" could not be
achieved without political intervention. Bell's response to this limitation was the pro-
motion of regulatory authority in utility commissions.
The Bell System objective of substituting regulation for the rigors of market
competition was met. In 191o Congress enacted the Mann-Elkins amendment to
the Interstate Commerce Commission Act, a portion of which conferred regulatory
authority over interstate telephone companies on the ICC.53 Between i9io and 192o
thirty-one states established authority for regulating intrastate operations of tele-
phone companies.5"
The history of the federal enactment is peculiar in that the original legislative
proposal was intended solely to confer appellate jurisdiction over ICC decisions
concerning railroad matters on a Commerce Court. In twenty-six parts of the hear-
ings before the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, there is no testi-
mony or mention of the communications industry.55 The original bill, as reviewed
by the committee, was amended on the floor of the House to confer authority on
the ICC over "telephone, telegraph and cable companies." 6 Representations of the
Bell System with regard to this legislation were made informally. The position
of the independent industry was also favorable, as reflected in a letter from J. B. Ware,
Secretary of the National Independent Telephone Association, to Senator W. Alden
Smith of Michigan.5"
It is not unlikely that the Bell System shared the view of Samuel Insull, Chicago
utility executive, when he told the National Civic Federation that he preferred to
"help shape the right kind of regulation than to have the wrong kind forced upon
[him]." 8 With clear-minded dedication, the Bell System did "help shape the right
kind of regulation." During these years it furnished legislative consultants to "help
and advise" state and federal legislators and to maintain continuing liaison with
regulatory commissioners and their staffs.
In the twenty-four years (1910-34) that the ICC regulated telephone companies,
the Commission dealt with telephone rates in only four cases, none of which involved
issues of major importance. "The Commission undertook no general rate investiga-
tions; it acted only on the basis of such complaints as were brought before it....
" Act of June i8, i9io, ch. 309, § 7, 36 Stat. 544.
" H.R. REP. No. io9, 67th Cong., rst Sess. 3-4 (1921).
r Hearings on Bills Affecting Interstate Commerce Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. (i9io).
" The legislative history of the Mann-Elkins Act is filed in the ICC reference room.
" Letter from J.B. Ware to Senator NV. Alden Smith, May 20, 1910, 45 CONG. Rae. 6973-74 (910):
"[T]he Bell interests have in spots furnished service at less than cost, and in many instances
without cost for months, and ... years ....
"We do not ask the Government to fight our battles, but we do ask for protection against
outrageous methods of warfare which are illegal and detrimental to the public welfare ...
We are not afraid of supervision; we believe in regulation ...."
"
8 Letter from Ralph M. Easley to George W. Perkins, June 9, i909, in J. WINSTEIN, Tim CoRPoaATE
IDEAL IN =a LIBERAL STATE: i9oo-i918 at 87 (1968).
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In the absence of serious pressure to exert its power in the communications field,
regulation went largely by default."59
We have the vision of hindsight. President Vail, after four years of operating
under the law, enlarged upon his regulatory experience in addressing his share-
holders:
Regulation and control by commissions or business courts have . . . become
a permanent feature of our economic laws. . . . The few years' experience has
brought out prominently both good and bad features, but it has demonstrated ...
a satisfactory solution of the economic problems ....
Business courts . . . will soon bring order and security out of the present
uncertainty and be a bulwark against future economic disturbance.
... [T]he Bell System has no cause for complaint, protest or criticism as to its
relations with ... commissions .... [R]ight and reason have been the controlling
influences in the conclusions reached. 60
IV
CONCLUSION
In a sense all business enterprise is a flight from competition. The penalties of
competition-low or nonexistent profits-may be avoided by superior efficiency, by
product innovation or differentiation, or by attenuation of the competitive process
through control over supply and price wielded monopolistically or through con-
spiracy or tacit understanding with competitors. Confronted by the vigorous com-
petitive inroads of independent operating companies, the Bell System sought to
escape the unaccustomed hardships of competition by acquiring competitors, by
limiting their markets and their services, and by espousing the development of
governmental regulatory functions. The public service commissions, which ultimately
stabilized rates and earnings, adopted the norms of business policy urged by the
System and imposed strictures on the "unintelligent competition." The advantages
thus gained by the Bell System over its remaining competition have been parlayed
into a practically unassailable market position fortified by political and legal
ramparts.
The thesis has been posed that telephone competition during the years 1893-
1920 was neither inefficient nor costly but was, on the contrary, productive of
benefits sharply outweighing its costs. It was not just the working out of the com-
petitive market process toward the emergence of inevitable "natural" monopoly
which destroyed the structure that permitted competition to flourish and its benefits
to be enjoyed; it was as much a poorly conceived, Bell-inspired, protectionist regu-
' M. FAINSOD, L. GORDON, & J. PALAMOUNTAIN, GOVERNMENT AND THE AMERICAN EcONOiy 375 (3d
ed. 1959).
9o 114 AT&T ANN. REP. 47-49.
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latory policy which failed to preserve such competition as might usefully have served
the public interest. This history is irreversible in that private telephone monopoly is
established and institutionalized. In the absence of advocates for countervailing in-
terests, the viewpoint of private monopoly has melded with and been espoused by
public regulatory authority. The contemporary rationale for communications
monopoly has not moved far ahead of Theodore Vail; the words are different, but
results and objectives remain the same. In the name of "systemic integrity, .... econo-
mies of scale," and "unitary planning," arguments have been made for extending
the present market and regulatory structure.6 Yet over the long run, dynamic
technology may provide more effective control over communication rates and
services than unaided regulation can supply. After years of experience, regulation
remains unproved, but the gratifying performance of the competitive market-
place from 1893 to 192o has been forgotten. Perhaps, if nothing else, the public
presumption that regulation is necessarily inspired and informed by the public in-
terest can be re-evaluated in the light of the history recalled above.
Revolutionary shifts in technology and aggressive innovation will be aborted if
they do not receive the support of thoughtful public policy. The Presidential
Task Force on Communications Policy has suggested that domestic communications
satellite service be treated as a regulated monopoly. 2 The Task Force maintains
that spectrum shortage and the limited number of orbital "parking slots" necessitate
a single, multiple-purpose satellite system. But any policy must operate within
existing technical constraints; policy making only begins at this stage. We must also
consider what organizational forms will permit the greatest development of the art,
the widest play of operating alternatives, and the most deliberate impetus to novel
and experimental application of satellite technology. In a sense we are again at
the same threshold that policy makers confronted in 1893 with the opening up of a
new industry. Today, as then, policy decisions on market structure and the respective
roles of competition and regulation, once made, cannot be easily reversed.
1 TAsx FoRcE REPORT, supra note 4, ch. 6.
"a id. ch. 5. This proposal has not been favorably received by Bell System spokesmen. See Ashley,
International Communications: What Shape to Come?, in this symposium, p. 417.
